CROSBY r. MASON.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
TALCOTT CROSBY AND ANOTHER v. AMASA MASON AND
OTHERS.
Executors and trustees, by bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader, may take
the advice of a court of chancery upon questions connected with the discharge of
their duties.
The interposition of the court in such cases is discretionary, and will not be
exercised except in matters of importance.
The testator gave to Amasa, his son, "1the sum of $90,000, which sum is to be
made up of his notes, drafts, &c., which will be found sealed up and among my
papers and directed to him, to be delivered to him by the executors in discharge
of this bequest." There was found among the testator's papers a package sealed
and directed in the handwriting of the testator thus: " For Amasa Mason-notes,
drafts, &c., to make up the sum of $90,000 devised to him in my -will." The
package, on being opened, was found to contain notes, drafts, &c., against Amasa,
for $90,281. Among the papers of the deceased, but not in the package, was a
note against Amasa for $33,000 and interest, of a date anterior to the will, also a
book account of $6000, mostly prior to the date of the will. A memorandum in
the handwriting of the deceased, and his declarations, also a paper signed by
Ainasa, were offered in evidence to show that the $33,000 note and the $6000
account were not intended to be included among the notes and drafts to be delivered
to Amasa by the executors in discharge of the $90,000 bequest. Held, that this
evidence was inadmissible.
Hedd, also, that the fact of findin among the papers of the deceased the package
answering the description in the will, the superscription on the package, and its
contents, were all proper and admissible evidence for the purpose of identification.
Held, also, that by the terms of the will in connection with this evidence, such
notes and drafts only as were found in the package were to be delivered to Ama;a
by the executors in discharge of the bequest.
Interest is not chargeable upon book-debts except by virtue of special custom or
agreement. Hed, therefore, in the absence of all proof on the subject, that the
book-debt above named did not bear interest.
The will provided, in the event of payments thereafter made by reason of certain
supposed liabilities, "whether the same be paid upon judgment recovered or bv
compromise," that one-fifth of the sums so to be paid be charged to his son. On
these liabilities suits werebrought and large sums properly and judiciously expended
by the executors in defending against them. Held, that no part of these expenses
of suit could under the will be charged to the son.

BILL in equity, brought by the petitioners as executors and
trustees under the will of William Hail Mason, asking the advice
of the superior court as to the proper construction of the will ;
citing in as respondents William H. Mason and John J. Mason,
sons of the testator and legatees under the will, and Amasa

CROSBY v. MASON.

Mason, another son and legatee, to contest between themselves
certain questions with regard to their relative rights which were
affected by the construction of the will. The facts were found
by the superior court, and the case reserved for the advice of this
court. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
V. TV. McFarland,for the petitioners.
C. B. Goodrich of Massachusetts, and T. C. Perkins, with
whom was C. W. Storey of Massachusetts, for Amasa Mason.
0. S. Seymour and Penrose, for William H. Mason and John
J. Mason.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DUTTON, J.-The petitioners, representing themselves as executors of the last will and testament of William Hail Mason, late
of Thompson in this state, and also as trustees of a large amount
of property under the provisions of this will, ask the advice of this
court as a court of chancery, with reference to what they claim
to be doubtful questions on the construction of the will, and as to
what their duties are in the settlement of the estate and the discharge of their trust.
It has been suggested on the argument that this is not the
proper mode of settling questions ,of this kind between heirs,'
legatees, and cestuis que trust.
We think it is too late in this state to raise such a question.
The case of Wdite v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 31, was very similar to this.
This court in that case, on the application of the executor and
trustee, decided a number of questions on the construction of the
will of the testator. Such applications ought not to be favored
excepting where great interests are involved and a decision in
the ordinary course of litigation would be attended 'with great
inconvenience, delay, and expense. It would be difficult to
obtain competent and suitable persons to -accept situations -of
great perplexity and responsibility, unless they were permitted
to obtain the advice of, a court of chancery as to the proper discharge of their duties. The court is not bound to entertain such
an application, as its interference in such cases is always a matter
of discretion. It is clearly for the advantage of all parties in
interest to have questions of law, interrupting and delaying the
settlement of estates, disposed of in this way, and they have a
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full opportunity to be. heard. In this case it appears that an
estate of three or four hundred thousand dollars is waiting for
the decision of this court on certain points of law. If such an
application ought ever to be entertained, it ought to be in this
case.
The important questions in this case are not very numerous
nor very complicated.
The testator, William Hail Mason, made a will prior to the
execution of the will in question, containing substantially many
of the same provisions as are contained in this will, which has
been spread upon the record, and which it has been claimed may
be referred to as a means of explaining some of the provisions
of this will. Whether such use could be made of it we do not
deem it necessary to inquire, as we do not find that any of the
provisions of this will are so doubtful as to need aid of this
kind.
The will in question was dated June 29th 1858. The principal question in the case arises on the corstruction which ought
to be given to the third item of the will, which is as follows :"Item third. I give, devise, and bequeath to my son Amasa
Mason the sum of ninety thousand dollars, which sum is to be
made up and to consist of his notes, drafts, and other evidences
of debt, advancements I have made him and on his account, and
charges against him on my books of account, which will be found
sealed up and among my papers, and directed to him; which
notes, drafts, and other evidences of debt are to be delivered to
him by my execufors, and proper discharges given him by them
for the debts and charges aforesaid, and the same slidI be in full
of this bequest of ninety thousand dollars; and in no case shall
this item of my will be so construed or regarded as to call for the
payment of any sum of money to fulfil the terms of the same."
It appears by the finding in the case that after the death of the
testator a package was found containing notes, drafts, and'other
evidences of debt against Amasa Mason, amounting to a little
over 90,000, which was sealed up, and on it written the words,
" For Amasa Mason-accounts, notes, drafts, and vouchers to
make up to him the sum of $90,000 devised to him by will."
There were also found among the papers of the testator a note
of 833,000, given by Amasa Mason to his father and due before
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the will was executed, and a book accouiA of $6000.78, .chiefly
also of an earlier date.
The counsel of Amasa, Mason claimed that by the true construction of the will these evidences of debt ought to be given up
to him as well as those in the package. They insisted that the
expression, "to be made up and to consist of his notes, drafts,
and other evidences of debt, &c.," ought to be regarded as
embracing all of the notes, drafts, and accounts which he then
held against Amasa-the words, "which will be found sealed up,
&c.," being used merely by way of description; and that the
fact that certain notes, drafts, and accounts were found in a
package, although superscribed by the testator, could not vary
this construction. It is insisted also that a phrase in the second
codicil---" after the delivery of the said notes,.,drafts, and evidences of debt to my said son Amasa," is in aid of this as the
true meaning of the will.
We think this would be a forced construction. The words in
the will which are relied upon as sustaining it are immediately
connected with the words, "which will be found sealed up and
among my papers and directed to him." This shows very clearly
that the testator intended to give up to Amasa those evidences
of debt and those only which would be found after his death
sealed up in the package. We see no reason why a testator
could"not designate the articles which he intends to bequeath to
a particular legatee, by pointing out the place where they will
be found ; as if he should give to a particular child all the
clothes that would be found locked up in a certain drawer. The
testator in the present case appears to have taken great pains to
prevent any misunderstanding or mistake. He had selected the
papers, sealed them up, and directed the package with his own
hand.
There is nothing in the language of the codicil that leads to a
different conclusion. On the contrary, it refers to the debts and
charges from which Amasa was to be discharged as having been
mentioned and provided for in the third item of his will. We
must resort to that item, therefore, to explain the meaning of the
codicil.
To hold that these two debts, amounting to about forty thousand dollars, were to be givedi up to Amasa, in addition to those
evidences of debt which were contained in the package, would
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destroy that general equality which it is manife st from the whole
will the testator intended to make among his three sons. On the
face of the will he gives to each of them about $90,000. But
if these debts are to be given up to Amasa he would have about
$40,000 more than the others. If the testator had intended to
give to- him so valuable an article as a note of $33,000, it is
reasonable to suppose that he. would have done it in explicit
terms.
It is asked, if the testator did not intend that these claims
should be given up and discharged with the others, why did he
not explicitly except them. The obvious answer is, that he had
no occasion to do so. They constituted a portion of his estate.
They would be collectible like any other claims unless he made a
different disposition of them. It was the same as if he had
directed certain claims, describing them particularly, to"be given
up. Others not specified would of course remain a part of the
estate.
Amasa's counsel objected to the superscription on the package
on the ground that, if admitted in evidence, it would be making
out a bequest by interpolating a separate writing into the will.
If such would be the effect the objection would be well founded.
If there is not a complete bequest without adopting the superscription it would fail. The words of the superscription, "devised
to him by will," cannot be used in evidence to show that the
evidences of debt contained in' the package were bequeathed.
But the whole superscription may be used as a mark put upon
the package by means of which it would appear that this package
was the one referred to in the will.
It is objected further, that to introduce parol evidence to prove
that such a package was found with such a superscription upon
it, would be to control the operation of a written instrument by
such evidence. We can see no greater objection to the introduction of this evidence to identify the package as the one to which
the will refers, -than to the common unobjectionable practice
of introducing parol evidence to show that there is a piece of
land which corresponds to the description contained in a deed.
The facts regarding the finding of the package, its contents, and
the superscription on it, are admissible for the purpose of identification and nothing else.
After the death of the testator Amasa 'Mason gave a -receipt
VOL. XV.-2
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for the $6000.78, containing the words "to be reckoned as an
advancement out of the estate towards bequests to me or for my
benefit, in his last will and testament, the same to apply to any
legacy made to me or to any person in trust for my benefit."
His counsel now object to this as evidence to control or explain
the will. The objection is well founded. However much it may
tend to show that the principal claim made in this case was an
afterthought, still the admission, if any is made by Amasa in this
writing, was merely of a point of law, and his opinion of the
legal effect of the will, whether in his own favor or against him,
is of no account.
The memorandum of William Hail Mason, the testator, on the
$38,000 note, stating why he received it, and what his executors
were to do with it, is no legal evidence against the maker of the
note, as it does not appear that he was privy to the indorsement.
As the will makes no reference to this note or to this indorsement, it cannot be used to give a construction to it.
The objection to verbal declarations made by the testator
regarding the #883000 note and the $6000.78 book-debt, is still
stronger.
After excluding all this testimony we are clearly of opinion
that the note and book-debt are legal and valid against Amasa in
the hands of the executors as a part of the estate.
There are some questions of minor importance which can be
more readily disposed of. The other devisees claim that the
share of Amasa ought to be charged with the expenses of defending suits against William H. Mason as a partner of Gibson. The
superior court finds that expenses were necessarily incurred, and
that by the defences and judicious compromises a large sum was
saved to the estate. We have no means of understanding the
relation of Amasa to the Gibson concern. We must be governed,
therefore, by the words of the codicil, which charges his share
with one-fifth of only such "sum or sums of money" paid "upon
or by reason of any such supposed or claimed liability or liabilities, whether the same be paid upon a judgment or judgments
recovered, or by way of compromise of any such supposed liability or liabilities." Suits were brought and defended till a
compromise was effected. The money paid on the compromise is
not objected to. We see no equitable reason why the expenses
should -not be brought in, except that the will, which is our only
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guide, does hot provide for it, and therefore this claim must be
disallowed.
The executors ask advice whether, in case the S33,000 note
and the $6000.78 book-debt shall be held valid against Amasa,.
interest ought to be computed on them. The note is drawn with
interest and should draw it like any other note. No evidence
has been given as to whether the book-debt should draw interestor not. We understand the rule adopted in this state to be, that
rirnud facie a mere account on book does not draw interest:
Day v. Lockwood, 24 Conn. 186. Evidence may be introduced
to show that by the agreement or understanding of the parties
interest may be charged. Proof of custom is also allowed. As
there is no evidence on the point it is not a case for interest.
We advise the superior court to pass a decree directing
that the estate be settled in conformity with the views herein
expressed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The foregoing case embraces one topic
of great practical concern in the settlement of estates: the right of the personal representative to demand the aid
and direction of a court of equity in
regard to the mode of performing his
duties. This is a matter of great concern to the representative, and to the
extent of his personal responsibility.
For if he assume to act upon his own
jut gment and discretion in a matter
of bond fide doubt, and where he
might ask the direction of the court in
such a form as to settle the rights of all
parties and relieve all doubt and uncertainty, he must be regarded as acting
voluntarily upon his own responsibility
in a matter where there was no actual nece.sity of his assuming any such responsibility; and if it should ultimately appear
that he was mistaken in regard to the
law, it will afford no justification or
excuse that he acted according to his
bet judgment and discretion and in the
most undoubted good faith in a matter
where he might have certainty to guide

him in the performance of his duty. No
trustee has any right to act upon uncercertainties or probabilities, merely.
The subject is extensively and learnedly discussed in an important case,
Treadwell v. Cordis, 5 Gray 341, 348,
by a judge of great learning and discretion, SnAw, C. J., where the rule is
thus defined: The rule extends to "cases
where the trustees are actors and seek
the aid and direction of a court of equity,
where there is doubt and difficulty, and
whore there are conflicting claims on the
part of different parties to the same
property or rights under the instrument
by which such trust is created. It has
been so held in the analogous case of a
trust created by a deed interpartes: ** *
Dinunocc v. Bixby, 20 Pick- 368. And
the same doctrine was applied to trusts
under a will in the recent case of Hoopcr
v. Hooper,9 Cush. 127." The principle
of the decision, as stated by the reporter,
is : The court have jurisdiction in equity
of a bill by executors to obtain the direction of the court in the execution of
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trusts arising under a will, when the
same property is claimed under the will
by different parties.
This class of suits, as affecting claims
under instruments creating trusts, such
as wills and family settlements, is more
commonly instituted by the trustees ;
but such a suit may be brought by any
party having or making a claim under
such trust, by making the trustees and
all other claimants parties to the suit:
Bowers v. Smith, lb Paige 193.
But the decree in all such suits will
bind only the interests represented in
the suit: Atkinson v. Holtby, 10 House
Lords Cas. 313,
This class of bills have been, more
commonly perhaps, denominated bills
of interpleader, which in strictness they
are not, but only bills in the nature of or
analogous to bills of interpleader. They
are not bills of interpleader always, in
the sense that the person holding the
estate or property has no interest in the
determination of the questions involved;
far the trustee is always interested, generally, as trustee, and he may have, a
special and personal interest beyond that:
2 Story's Eq. Jur., § 824; Mohawk 4Hudson Railroadv. Clute, 4 Paige 384.
To this same general head may be
referred a bill by the heir to set, aside a
will, devising the estate to others, on the
ground of fraud: J.ones v. Gregory, 9
Law Times N. S. 556; s. 0., 9 Jur. N.
S. 1171. But it is said the heir at law
will not be allowed to maintain such a
suit as matter of course, and especially
where there are indications that he may
have fraudulently suppressed the will
It is matter of discretion with the court.
Such suits, when instituted by the heir
at law to set aside a.will, are more commonly referred to a court of law under
the form of an issue devisavit vel non :
lVilliams v. Williams, 9 Law Times N.
S. 566 ; s. a., 9 Jur. N. S. 1267: Cowgill v. Rhwdes, 12 W. Rep. 190.
The costs of such a litigation are

chargeable upon the general fund. Thus,
if the controversy arises in regard to the
construction of the will, as to a particu.
lar legacy, the expense of determining
that question belongs to the general
expenses of settling the estate, and must
come out of the whole estate: Studholme
v. Hodgson, 3 P. Win. 299, 303; Pearson v. Pearson, 1 Sch.& Lef. 10, 12; Barrington v. Tristram, 6 Vesey 345 ; Jolliffe
v. East, 3 Br. C. C. 25; Baugh v.
Reed, Id.. 192 ; Mos Tox, J., in Sawyer
v. Baldwin, 20 Pick. 378, 388, 389 ; Sir J.
RossinLY, M. R., in Attorney-General v.
Jesus College, Oxford, 7 Jur. N. S. 592 ;
Vice-Chancellor STUA.RT, in Wheeler v.
Thomas, 7 Jur. N."S. 599. These suits
are here denominated suits "to obtain
a declaration of the rights of the parties
interested under the will, and for the
administration of the estate, by the
court." They are shortly called "administrative suits." The American cases
in equity have adopted the same rule, as
to costs, from an early day: Rogers v.
1?oss, 4 Johns. Ch. 608; Morrell v.
Dickey, 1 Id. 153. In the former of
these cases, KxN T, Chancellor, said,
In this class of cases, it has been frequently decided "that costs ought to be
charged upon the general assets of a
testator, or upon the fund created by
his will, if the will be so drawn as to
create difficulty and render a -resort' to
this court advisable." Costs are sometimes apportioned among the several
interests, according to equity: Puxley
v. Puxley, 8 Law Times N. S. 570, by
Vice-Chancellor WooD. But the rule
of charging costs, both taxable and
actual, as between attorney and client,
upon the general fund and not upon the
particular one in controversy, is more
commonly followed: Andrew's Ex. v.
Bishop, 5 Allen 490, where the point is
conceded by counsel. See also Mood v.
landenburgh, 6 Paige 277; Lord Ei.DoN, Chancellor, in Barringtonv. Tristram, surn'a.
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In the En-lish practice, it is more
common to pay the fund to be administered into court and have the trustee
di-cihrted, with his own costs, and leave
the court to administer the fmud according to equitable principles, through the
instrumentality of its own appointees:
In re Swan, 2 H1.& M. 34; In re Burber,
9 Jut. X. S. 1098 ; In re Bloye's
Trusts, I 'Mc N. & G. 488 ; In re loeodbu,'s 11711, 1 De G. & J. 333.
And the distinction between paying
the costs of the litigation out of the particular fund or out of the general assets,
is there often made to turn upon the
question whether the entire fund is paid
into court to be administered, or only
the particular fund in controversy
Thoamas Y. Jones, 1 Drew. & Sm. 134;
Marti,,eau v. Rogcrs, 8 De G. M. & J.
328.
'Where the party does not bring the
particular fund into court, but asks for
advice generally, the cost, of all parties
who have acted in good faith, as between
attorney and client, must come out of
the general funds. And when the fund
is no longer under the control of the
court, having been paid over by the
trustee to the party entitled to retain it,

no order for the payment of co-rs ,nt
of the fund can e made. it is -aid:
Ann DLs Exrs. v. loTudorea's Adnur., 1
McCarter 135.
By the English statute of 22 & 23
Vict. c. 35, s. 30, executors and other
trus-tees are allowed to petition the couts
of equity for direction how to proceed in
all matters of discretion afllctiug tie
administration of the trust, which they
could not do upon general principles, a
discretion reposed in a particuiar pcrmou
not being subject upon general principles
to the control of any court.
It is scarcely needfid to say that as
this question comes within the range
of our discussions in the work on Wills,
the foregoing note is little more than an
abstract of what is found there, pt. 1,
§ 36, as we know of nothing new which
could be said upon the subject; and we
must refer the reader to that place for a
fuller abstract of the cases aid of the
principles involved.
We have found no reason to question
the general soundness of the decision in
the principal case, and we trust does
additional suggestions will prove of interest to the profession.
I. F. R.

SuPreme Court of Indiana.
TILE AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY v.CALVIN FLETCHER ET AL.
A person calling himself A. sent a telegram to a bank to send him a sum of
money. The bank intrusted the package of money to an express company, whi.'t
undertook to deliver it to "A. in person." Thie express company delivered the
money to tie person who had sent the telegram, but who proved not to be A., lIot
a pretender, and the money was thereby lost.
Held, that the company was liable whether it received the package as a common
carrier or as a forwarder only.

APPEAL from the 'Marion Cbmmon Pleas.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
FrAZLR, C. J.-Fletcher and Sharp, who were bankers at
Indianapolis, sued the appellants for the loss of a package of paper
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money, which the latter undertook to convey from Indianapolis to
Arcola, Illinois, and to deliver to one "J. 0. Riley, in person."
It so appears by the receipt given for the package, a copy of
which is made a part of the complaint. The complaint is in two
paragraphs in the usual form, as against a common carrier,-the
first charging a loss by negligence ; and the second, that the
package was carelessly delivered to another person than Riley,
and thereby lost. It is alleged in both paragraphs, that the
defendant was a foreign corporation, and a common carrier of
goods and money, &c. It is not alleged that it had complied with
the provisions of our statute concerning express companies (1 G.
& H. 327, § 2), but no question arises as to that.
The answer was-1. The general denial. 2. That the agent of
the express company at Arcola was also operator-of the telegraph
line communicating with Indianapolis; and that a person pretending to be J. 0. Riley despatched through the said operator a
telegram to the plaintiff, requesting them to send him $1900 by
express; that in due time the same agent received by express a
package purporting to contain valuables, addressed to J. 0. Riley,
whereupon the same person who had despatched the *telegram,
demanded said package, and it was thereupon delivered to himand that this was the same grievance mentioned in the complaint.
3. That upon the arrival of the package at Arcola, a person presented himself claiming to be J. 0. Riley, and demanded the
package, and having identified himself as the very person upon
whose telegram, despatched on the day previous, in the name of
J. 0. Riley, the package had been forwarded; thereupon the
defendant having no other means of identifying the claimant, anid
believing him to be the genuine J. 0. Riley, delivered the same
to him.
Demurrers were sustained to the second and third paragraphs
of the answer, and this raises the only question presented for our
consideration. The paragraphs are the same in legal effect, and
were, in our opinion, not good.
The express undertaking of the appellant was to deliver the
package to "J. 0. Riley, in yerson." The utmost that the
answer alleged was, that the delivery was to another person, who
pretended to be Riley. He identified himself merely as having
so pretended on the day before, by transmitting a telegram in
Riley's name. This was no better evidence that his name was

ALLEN v. CONRAD.

Riley, than if he had so stated to the express agent or any third
person. That the package had been sent in response to a telegram
purporting to be from J. 0. Riley, simply proved that Riley had
credit, or some arrangement, with the plaintiffs to furnish him
money, and that the package was sent to him-not that he was'
the person who sent the despatch, or that. any man pretending to
be le was to receive it. The electric fluid was not capable of
transmitting the man's autograph, so that the plaintiffs could have
any opportunity of detecting an imposition. This the defendant
was bound to know, and should have acted accordingly. The
failure to act with proper caution was such negligence as clearly
rendered the defendant liable for its consequences, even though
its liability be limited to that of a forwarder, as was attempted to
be done by the receipt given. That liability holds him to ordinary diligence; . e., such care as every prudent man commonly
takes of his own property. The payment of $1900 of a man's
own money to a stranger, without requiring him to identify himself as the person really entitled to it, would be an act of very
gross carelessness.
Without considering whether the facts pleaded in the second
and third paragraphs of the answer would have been admissible
in evidence under the general denial, we are of opinion that
those paragraphs were justly held bad on demurrer. The class
of cases cited in the argument for the appellant, being cases where
payment had been made on forged orders, and it was held that
money thus paid to an innocent party could not be recovered back
unless notice of the forgery had been given on the same day, we
do not deem applicable to a case like this. The reason upon
which these decisions rest does not exist here.
Judgment affirmed, with two per cent. damages and costs.

SuTpreme Court of Pennsylvania.
JOHN ALLEN v. OSBORN CONRAD.
In an action, under statute, against a judgment-creditor for not entering satisfaction of the judgment, the record showed an execution on the judgnent, a rule
absolute on the creditor and the sheriff to showr cause why the debtor should not
pay a certain sum in full satisfaction of the judgment, interet, and costs, and a

ALLEN v. CONRAD.
return of the execution by the sheriff as "stayed by the order of court." There
was no record-evidence of the actual payment of the money, though it wds in fact
paid.
Held, that these facts did not constitute such satisfaction on the record, of the
judgment, as the statute demands.
Held, also, that evidence of special damage was not necessary, and the court
was not bound to limit the recovery to nominal damages.

ERROR to the District Court of .Philadelphia.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
WOODWARD, C. J.-This was an action of debt upon statute.
Allen held by assignment a judgment against Conrad, upon the
record of the District Court of December Term 1863, No. 177,
for the sum of $2936, which after payment in full, and after the
statutory demand for satisfaction, he had failed to satisfy of
record. This suit was brought to recover ddmages for that
neglect.
It was objected that the action would not lie, because the
record exhibited such proceedings upon the judgment as amounted
in law to a satisfaction of it, and, therefore, a formal entry of
satisfaction was not necessary under the 14th section of the Act
of Assembly of 13th Apfil 1791, Purd. 576. The proceedings
alluded to were as follows :-On the 7th of March 1864, a writ
of venditioni exponas having issued upon said judgment, and
being. then in the sheriff's hands, Conrad, the defendant, made
his affidavit, that on the 9th day of February before, he had tendered to the plaintiff the whole amount of debt, interest, and
costs, up to that time, and he prayed for a rule upon the sheriff
and plaintiff to show cause why he should not pay to the sheriff
the amount of debt, interest, and costs, accrued to the 9th day of
February, in full satisfaction of the said debt and costs.
On the same day such a rule was granted and proceedings
stayed. April 9th 1864, the rule was made absolute, and the
sheriff returned venditioni expona8, "stayed by order of the
court." There was no record evidence of the actual payment of"
the money to the sheriff, though the fact of payment to him and
by him to the plaintiff, was proved upon the trial of this cause.
Now, giving the utmost effect to the above proceedings that can
reasonably be claimed for them, they amount to no more than an
inferential satisfaction of the judgment. Grant that a searcher
of records, who happened to possess legal skill enough to knowi
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the effcct of a rule made absolute, might infer that the judgment
had b een satisfied ; yet the statute contemplates something more
palpable, something which the man most ignorant of legal forms
would understand to be satisfaction. It makes it the duty of the
person who has received satisfaction within eighty days after
request, to repair to the office of the prothonotary of the court
where the judgment is, and there " in the office" of the said prothonotary to enter satisfaction of the judgment, which shall "for
ever discharge, defeat, and release the same." The statute is thus
precise in prescribing the duty to be done in order that the
defendant's estate may be relieved of the lien, and in order also
that purchasers, encumbrancers, and all the world, may have the
same evidence, in kind and degree, of the satisfaction and discharge of the judgment as of its entry and existence. Inquirers
are not to be obliged to search files and to weigh the legal effect
of sheriffs' returns of writs of execution ; but the record of the
judgment is to be made to inform them that the judgment no
longer exists.
Would a prudent conveyancer have passed a title of the defendant as unencumbered with thia record before him? He would
have found the judicial order for staying the vend. exp. was made
on the 7th of March, when the rule was granted, and that the
sheriff's return " stayed by order of the court," without date, must
be referred to that order. But that would imply no payment of
money. The rule was for leave to pay the plaintiff the money
that had been tendered, and upon granting the rule the execution
was stayed ; but the rule was not made absolute until the 9th of
April. Was the money paid after that date, and in pursuance of
the leave thus granted ? On this point the record says not a
word-it is mute. The conveyancer would have to go farther to
satisfy his doubts; he would have to inquire of the sheriff, and
examine receipts, and decide a question of fact upon such evidence as he could obtain, which the statute meant should be
decided by the plaintiff himself on the very record of the judgment. The preamble to the statute recites the evils which frequently happen from leaving judgments long unsatisfied on record,
although the money for which these judgments have been rendered
is justly discharged, "whereby defendants in such cases as well
as the subsequent purchasers of real property suffer much vexation
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and inconvenience ;" and we must construe the statute so as to
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
We hold, therefore, that notwithstanding the proceedings
alluded to, and the payment of the money to the sheriff, there was
no such satisfaction entered upon the judgment in question as
relieved the owner of the judgment from the duty of complying
with the defendant's request, and that the action was well
brought.
The only other question upon the record regards the measure
of damages. The statute prescribes no measure except as it
limits them to not exceeding half of the debt.
The court declined to limit the jury to nominal damages, though
there was no evidence of special damage. In .Yenry v. Sims, 1
Wh. 187, it was ruled, that in such an action .actual damages
need not be proved, and that the jury may take into consideration
all the circumstances by which the party has suffered vexation and
inconvenience. In the instance before us the statutory limit was
not transcended, and we have no means of measuring the vexation
and inconvenience which the defendant's neglect of a plain duty
occasioned the plaintiff, .and, therefore, we cannot say that the
damages were excessive.
The judgment is affirmed.

Superior Court of Cincinnati.
SARAH S. THOMPSON v.. ADDISON S. THOMPSON ET AL.
Neither at the common law, nor by the statutes of Ohio, can a conveyance of
real estate be sustained unless there is a valuable or good consideration named
in the deed.
A pecuniary consideration is essential to uphold a deed of bargain and sale.
The consideration of love and affection is sufficient to uphold a covenant to stand
seised to uses.
.In the latter case, the grantee must be of the blood of the grantor; consanguinity, not affinity, is the rule. Thus, a deed to a son-in-law for the love the
grantor bears to the grantee and his wife, there being no grant to the wife, is not
sufficient to sustain the conveyance.
Conveyances of real estate in Ohio partake of the nature of feoffment, bargain,
and sale, and covenants to stand seised to uses. The usual form embodies parts
of all these assurances, but neither controls, absolutely, the grant.

THE

opinion of the court was delivered by

THOAMPSON v. THOMPSON ET A.L.
STORER, J.-This case is reserved from Special Term for our
decision on the following questions:First. Whether the deed of Robert Jones to 'McCalla Thompson, copied in the petition, is supported by any sufficient consideration, there being none in fact shown except such as is stated'
in that deed ?
Second. "It being made to appear that Robert Jones has conveyed the premises in question, in fee simple, to the plaintiff by
deed executed since the death of McCalla Thonipson, and his
only child, is said Jones a competent witness in the case for the
plaintiff to prove that the deed to McCalla Thompson was executed and delivered to him by mistake, in that it was, in reality,
intended to be executed and delivered to the plaintiff?
To understand the application of these questions, we have
referred to the pleadings and testimony taken in the cause, and
find the following facts alleged and proved:The plaintiff is the daughter of Robert Jones, and intermarried
with McCalla Thompson in November 1848; before this event
took place her father had avowed his intention to convey -to her
certain real property in Cincinnati, and, after the marriage bad
been consummated, again expressed the same purpose, in a note,
which is found in the case. To complete this object, on the 28th
of September 1850 he executed a deed to Mc~alla Thompson,
which was prepared by the grantee himself, by which, after
reciting "that, whereas the said Thompson having theretofore
intermarried with the plaintiff, the daughter of said Robert Jones,
and for, and in consideration of, the premises, and the natural
love and affection which said Jones has and entertains for his
daughter and said Thompson, and for the purpose of advancing
the said Thompson in life, said Jones bargains, sells, and conveys
to said MeCalla Thompson the property now in controversy, and
which is particularly described, to have and to hold the same
with its appurtenances, rights, and privileges, unto said Thompson, his heirs and assigns, for ever,' there are no covenants in
the deed, not even those which are found in the ordinary quitclaim conveyance.
In January 1850 a son was born of the marriage, and in
November 1852 McCalla Thompson, the husband, deceased,
leaving this child to survive him, who died in November 1863.
M1eanwhile the property has been in the possession of the plaintiff,
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through her father, who has controlled it for her use. The brothers and sisters of MeCalla Thompson now- claim they are
invested with the title as heirs at law of the deceased son of the
plaintiff and her husband, the Statute of Descents in Ohio thus
regulating the descent, if the deed from Robert Jones to the
plaintiff's husband vested the estate in the grantee.
To quiet the plaintiff's possession, establish her right to the
estate, and to declare the conveyance from her father to her husband to have been made for her benefit, as well as for general
relief, this petition is filed against the defendants, who represent,
as they allege, their nephew's estate: it further appears, that the
plaintiff's father, finding the deed he had made to his son-in-law
did not conform to his intention, expressed before, and at the time
of, its execution, in Jatiuary last prepared another deed, which he
executed in due form, conveying all his right, interest, and estate
in the premises to the plaintiff, to hold to her and her heirs
for ever.
The defendants deny by answer the allegation in the petition,
that the- deed from the plaintiff's father to her husband was
intended to operate for her benefit, but, on the contrary, for the
sole use of the grantee.
We have carefilly considered the facts presented by the record,
and heard the arguments of counsel upon one of the questions
reserved. That question is, what estate, if any, did McCalla
Thompson acquire by the conveyance from the plaintiff's father,
and what was the legal effect of the instrument, claimed to have
been a, deed, by which the property is assumed to have been
granted to his son-in-law ? We have confined ourselves solely to
the consideration of that question, as our answer to it is decisive
of the case.
At common law, it is clear, the deed referred to could not be
sustained as a bargain and sale, no pecuniary, or other valuable,
consideration being recited in the instrument as passing from the
grantee to the grantor, or proved to have been paid by evidence
aliunde. The reason of the rule is, that a sale ex vi terrnini
supposes the transfer of a right for money-the very name of the
assurance imports a quid pro quo: Mildmay's Case, 1 Coke 176 ;
Sharington v. Crofton, Plowden 803. These cases are referred
to in all subsequent decisions by the English courts as settling
the law, and have been sustained without reservation.
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In the United States the same rule is adopted, and we find no
exception to its operation in any reported case. On the contrary,
the courts of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
North Carolina, and Kentucky, have expressly recognised it,
holding the deed to be void where no such consideration is
described or proved.
Nor would the deed before us have been sustained as containing
words which might operate as a covenant to stand seised to uses,
as no sufficient consideration, such as blood, or marriage, is
alleged.
The conveyance is to the son-in-law, for the love and affection
the grantor bears to his daughter and her husband, and there is
no estate conveyed to her.
Hence it appears to us, looking through very many cases,
both ancient and modern, decided by the English courts, that
this conveyance would not be there upheld upon any common-law
principle, or under the Statute of Uses.
There is no doubt that consanguinitw, not affinity, blood relationship, not that existing by marriage merely, may well support
a covenant to stand seised ; but the parties must sustain the relation of father and child or grandchild, brother and sister, or
nephew and niece.
We cannot find a case in the English books where a son-in-law
has been held to be within the rule, either to take for his own
benefit, or to uphold the estate for another. The ancient law
upon the subject was very fully reviewed, and the authorities
from Lord Paget's Case, 1 Leonard 195, critically examined in
itesman and Others v. Sebring and Others, 16 Johnson 515,
and the conclusion at which the court arrived was that we have
indicated.
We find the same result expressly stated by Baron Comyns in
his Digest, vol. 2, tit. Covenants, G., §§ 3, 4, G.
See, also, Sanders on Uses, vol. 2, pp. 97, 98, 99.
In the United States we discover a few dicta only, not a single
decision which contravenes the established law upon this point.
The case of Bell v. canmn, 15 N. H. 881, is an instance,
and the ruling in Gale v. Colburn, 18 Pick. 401, would seem to
give color to a different rule ; but neither, when properly examined, in any essential degree, can be said to change the ancient
doctrine.
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We conclude, therefore, that, at common law, as well as by the
decisions of the courts in our own country, the deed from Jones
to his son-in-law passed no estate, but, in reality, was inoperative
and void.
But it has been argued, that the conveyance may be sustained
as a feoffment, and, as such a transfer of the estate required no
consideration to be paid by the grantee, but took effect only by
livery of seisin, we are at liberty to uphold the deed before us
upon the same principle.
Before the Statute of Frauds title to real property might pass
by livery only, no instrument in writing being necessary; but
since the statute a deed is necessary, and the same ceremonial
of livery was requisite until the Act of 7 & 8 Vict. oh. 71, which
-requires only a legal seisin in the grantor.
Hence, it is clear that in England, practically speaking, there
is now no other mode of transfer than by bargain and sale, lease
and release, and covenant to stand seised.
I If the deed has the proper -words of grant, and contains a
sufficient consideration, it may operate in either mode to secure
the estate granted to the donee.
eIn Ohio we have no alienations by deed of feoffineiit.
Titles were never intended to be conveyed by such an instrument, though many of the words of grant it contained are still
used in our common- assurances.
. It was held in Lindsley's Lessee v. Coats, 1 Ohio 245, 246,
that "in no instance have the ancient common-law modes of conveyance, as such, been adopted in'this state, and long anterior to
the settlement of this country they had given way io the comparatively modern mode of assurance by lease and release,
bargain and sale."
By the Territorial Ordinance of 1787 .it is provided, that
"until the governor and judges shall adopt laws, real estate may
be conveyed by lease and release, bargain and sale, signed,
sealed, and delivered by the grantor, being of full age, and
attested by two witnesses ;" in pursuance of the power thus
granted, in 1795 they adopted the Pennsylvania statute, which
directed the manner of executing deeds, as well as their proof,
acknowledgment, and record, and the Territorial Legislature
afterwards enacted the Statute of January 20th 1802, to effect
the same purpose. The provisions of both these laws were sub.
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stantially re-enacted in February 1805, and since that time there
never has been, we are satisfied, any other opinion, either of the
courts, or the legal profession, than that we have stated.
In the case to which we have already referred it is said, " it
evidently was not the intention of Congress merely to legalize
those modes of conveyance which are mentioned in the ordinance,
leaving it at the option of owners of real estate, upon the sale of
their lands, to convey the same by the common-law mode of feoffment with livery of seisin, but to provide that every conventional
transfer of real property should be evidenced by deed." This
decision was affirmed in Lessee of Bently's Heirs v. Deforest, 2
Ohio 222, and again in Cressingerv. Lessee of Welch, 15 Ohio
192, where IIITCHCOCK, J., says: "In this country, and especially in this state, the mode of conveyance by feoffment is not
adopted. Lands here are conveyed by bargain and sale, and
deeds of other description."
"1The conveyance by feoffment with livery of seisin," says
Chancellor Kent, 4 Com. 548, " has long since become obsolete
in England, and though it has been in the United States a lawful
mode of conveyance, it has not been used in practice. Our conveyances have been either under the Statute of Uses, or short
deeds of conveyance in the nature of the ancient feoffment, and:
made effectual by being recorded, without the ceremony of
livery."
We are not permitted, then, to regard the conveyance in the
case before us as a deed of feoffment to be sustained upon any of
the principles which apply to that ancient mode of transfer. We
must consider it only upon the grounds we have already alluded
to, either as a bargain and sale, or a covenant to stand seised;
we cannot sustain it on the first, as no valuable consideration for
the conveyance is averred in the deed, or proved aliunde, nor
can we uphold it on the last, on the assumption of love and
affection, as the grantee was not of the blood of the grantor, but,
in legal contemplation, a stranger.
It follows, then, the deed from Jones to his son-in law, McCalla
Thompson, is simply void. No estate, therefore, passed to him,
and his heirs inherited nothing at his death.
This ruling disposes of the other question as to the admissibility of the grantor as a witness. Our decision renders it
unnecessary to consider this point.
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As irs. Thompson now holds the legal estate by deed from her
father, and is in possession of the property, her title till be
quieted, and a decree may be entered for that purpose, agreeably
to the prayer of the petitioner.

District Court of the United States-Districtof Kentucky.
THE UNITED STATES v. FIFTY-SIX BARRELS 0P WHISKEY.
'Where a statute in direct terms denounces a forfeiture of property as a penalty,
the forfeiture takes place at the time the offence is committed, and operates as a
statutory transfer of the right of property to the government.
In a proceeding in rein to ascertain the forfeiture, it is not material whether the
statute declares that the property shall be forfeited, or that the-offender -shall forfeit
it. In either case the date of the offence is the time to which the forfeiture relates.
Therefore in a proceeding for condemnation of whiskey for violation of sect. 68
of the Internal Revenue Act of 30th June 1864, the fact that 'the whiskey had
passed into the 4iands of a bondfide purchaser before the commencement of the suit
will not avail the claimant.
Nor is it material that before such purchase the whiskey had been regularly
branded by a United States inspector.
Where such purchaser has, for the purpose of rectification, mixed the whiskey
forfeited with other whiskey, so that it is not capable of identification, the whole is
liable to forfeiture.

Tais was a proceeding for the condemnation of fifty-six barrels
of whiskey and certain stills and other vessels, as forfeited to the
United States.
The information was founded on-the 68th section of the Internal
Revenue Act of 1864, and contained two counts.
The first count alleged, in substance, that one William E. Reed
was the owner of said stills and other vessels, and used the same
in the distillation of spirits continuously from September 1865
until the seizure herein, and that he had used said stills and
vessels in the distillation of the fifty-six barrels of whiskey seized,
but he did not, from day to day, make or cause to be made, in a
book kept for that purpose, a true and exact entry of the number
of gallons so distilled, or of the number sold or removed for consumption or sale.
The second count alleged that said Reed, owner of said stills
and vessels used by him in the distillation of spirits, did not
render to the assessor or to the assistant-assessor, on the 1st,
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11th, and 21st days of each and every month, or within five days
thereafter, or on the first day of each month, an account in duplicate, taken from his books, of the number of gallons of spirits
distilled, or the number sold or removed for consumption or sale.
Twenty-two of the barrels seized were claimed by William II.
Walker & Co., three were claimed by Gheens & Co., and the
remaining thirty-one, together with the stills and other vessels,
not having been claimed by any one, were condemned by default.
The claimants filed separate answers, but the defence 6f each
was substantially the same. Both denied every substantial allegation contained in the information, and both alleged that they
purchased the whiskey claimed by them respectively before the
seizure, bond fide, and that they paid for the same a full and fair
consideration, without any knowledge or suspicion of the alleged
forfeiture or cause of forfeiture. They also both alleged substantially, that the whiskey was, at the time of the purchase,
regularly and legally branded by plaintiff's inspector.
The case was, by agreement of parties, submitted to the court
upon the law and facts, a jury being waived.
BALLARD, D. J.-I
shall neither state nor discuss the facts
proven. My conclusion in re pect to these is, that every sub-.
stantial allegation of the information is true, and that no part of
the matter set up in the answers, in support of the claims, is sustained by the evidence except: 1st. That the barrels of whiskey
purchased by the claimants had been regularly branded by the
United States inspector prior to the purchase. 2d. That the
claimants are bond fide purchasers, without any notice of, or
cause to suspect, the alleged forfeiture.
These facts present the following questions for my decision, to
wit: First. Does the information set forth a good cause of forfeiture ? Second. Have the claimants supported their claims?
that is, do the facts alleged and proven by them constitute any
reason why the forfeiture should not be enforced ?
The 57th and 68th sections of the Internal Revenue Act
furnish a complete answer to the first question.
The 57th section makes it the duty of" every person who shall
be the owner of any still, boiler, or other vessel used * * * * for
the purpose of distilling spirituous liquors * * * * and of every
person who shall use any still, boiler, or other vessel as aforesaid,
VOL. XV.-3
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either as owner, agent, or otherwise, from day to day, to make a
true and exact entry, or cause to be entered in a book kept for
that purpose, the number of gallons of spirits distilled * * * *

and also the number sold or removed for consumption or sale."
The first count, we have seen, alleges a neglect of the duty
here enjoined.
This section also provides, that every such person, if he distill
one hundred and fifty barrels of spirits per year, or more, shall
render the assessor or assistant-assessor, on the first, eleventh,
and twenty-first days of each and every month in each year, or
within five days thereafter, an account in duplicate, taken from
his books, of the number of gallons of spirits distilled, and also
the number of gallons sold or removed for consumption or sale,
and that he shall pay the taxes on such spirits at. the time of rendering the duplicate account thereof. If he distill less than one
hundred and fifty barrels per year, he may make his returns and
pay duties on the first day of every month.
• The second count of the information avers a neglect of this
duty.
The 68th section provides "That the owner, agent, or superintendent of any * * * * * * still, boiler, or other Vessels used

in the distillation of spirits, on whith a duty is
neglect or refuse to make true and exact entry
do, or cause to be done, any of the things by
done as aforesaid, shall forfeit, for every such

payable, who shall
of the same, or to
law required to be
neglect or refusal,

all the * * spirits made by or for him, * * * and the stills,

boilers, and other vessels used in distillation, together with the
sum of five hundred dollars, * * * * * * which said- spirits,

with the vessels containing the same, with all the vessels used in
making the same, may be seized by any collector or deputycollector of internal duties, and held by him until a decision shall
be had thereon, according to law. * * * And the proceeding to
enforce said forfeiture of.said property shall be in the nature of a
proceeding in -rem."
It is manifest that the information does, in apt form and in apt
language, set forth neglects of duty for which a forfeiture is
denounced by the express terms of this section. This is conceded by the learned counsel of the claimants. They admit that
the property seized must be condemned as foifeited if the facts
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established by the claimants are not sufficient to show that, as to
the property claimed by them, there never was any forfeiture.
In respect to the first fact established by the claimants, that is,
that the barrels were regularly branded by the United States,
inspector before they purchased, it is clear that it furnishes no
answer to anything alleged in the information. Besides the
duties which are enjoined by the 57th section, the neglect of
which is alleged in the information, the 59th section requires
"That all spirits distilled as aforesaid by any person licensed as
aforesaid shall, before the same are used or removed for any
purpose, be inspected, gauged, and proved by some inspector
appointed for the performance of such duties." If the information had alleged a removal of the spirits distilled before inspection,
the fact that the barrels were branded before removal would have
been material. It, however, not only furnishes no answer to the.
charges set out in the information, that no entry was made from
day to day, in a book kept for that purpose, of the number of
gallons of spirits distilled, or the number removed for consumption
or sale, and that no return was made to the assessor, such as is
required by law, but it has not the slightest relation to either of
them. This is conceded by the counsel of the claimants. They
do not rely on this fact as precluding a condemnation. They treat
it simply as one of the facts which show that the claimants acted
in good faith and are bond fide purchasers, and, as I have already
announced that I am satisfied, upon the whole case, that the
claimants are such purchasers, it is wholly immateriil for me to
state what influence I have given to this single fact in arriving
at the more general conclusion of the good faith of the claimants.
If the barrels had not been branded by an inspector this would
have been a most material fact, if an effort had been made to show
bad faith, but no such effort has been made. That the claimants
were innocent purchasers is established, and is not, in fact, contested by the United States, and, therefore, the fact of the barrels
being branded is entitled to no consideration whatever.
This brings me to the consideration of the main question in the
case. Does the fact that the claimants purchased the whiskey
claimed by them bond fide, and without any knowledge or suspicion of the alleged cause of forfeiture, preclude a judgment of
condemnation ? This is a very important question, whether it be
considered in reference to the citizen or to the government. It
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has been argued before me with great ability, and I have bestowed
upon it much reflection.
The general law of property is, that the true owner may recover
it of any one who has it in possession, no matter whether the possessor be a bond fide purchaser or not. The law which protects
bond fide holders of bills of exchange and other negotiable paper
has no relation to property generally. Every purchaser of merchandise or other property risks, in a certain sense, the title of
his vendor, and, if it turns out that his vendor has no title and
the property be recovered of him, he has no remedy except on the
warranty of the vendor. It follows that, if when Walker & Co.
and Gheens & Co. purchased the whiskey claimed by them, their
vendor had no title-that is, if it had already been forfeited to
the United States, the fact that they are bondt fide purchasers
cannot avail them. Their good faith cannot oust the claim of the
true owner. They are exactly in the condition of every bond
fide purchaser of property whose title fails and who is therefore
obliged to surrender it to the owner. They must look to the
warranty of their vendor.
Indeed, I have difficulty in perceiving that the bona fides of
the purchase is at all material, or that it has any relation to the
grounds of forfeiturd alleged in the information. If the forfeiture
took place prior to their purchase, it is undisputed and indisputable that the right of property was immediately transferred to
the United States, and that the right of the latter must prevail
over that of the purchaser, notwithstanding the purchase was
made in good faith.
The right of the United States in such case depends not at all
on the conduct of the purchaser, but upon their own superior
title, resulting from a forfeiture which took place prior to any
inception of right in the purchaser.
If there was no forfeiture prior to the acquisition of right by
the claimants, whether the right was acquired by purchase for a
valuable consideration or by gift, I am at a loss to conceive how
there was any forfeiture at all. I cannot see how property,
whether acquired by gift or purchase, can be condemned as forfeited for the offence of its former owner, which was not already
forfeited at the time of the gift or purchase. If the acquisition
be by pretended gift or pretended purchase, in such sense that
the title is not changed, but really remains in the first owner,
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then, of course, his offence committed after the pretended gift or
sale may work a forfeiture. But neither the Internal Revenue
Act nor any other Act of Congress forfeits property for the crime
of a person which does not belong to him, or is not managed by
him at the time of the forfeiture. Property is sometimes forfeited'
in consequence of the act of some person who manages or controls
it other than the owner, but the forfeiture does not extend to property previously managed or controlled, and which, before being
contaminated with the offence, is sold or otherwise parted with in
good faith.
The question then comes to this: When does the forfeiture
denounced by the 68th section take place ? Does it take place
at the time the offence is committed, or at some subsequent time ?
The decisions are uniform, both in England and the United
States, that when a statute denounces a forfeiture of property as
the penalty for the commission of crime, if the denunciation is in
direct terms, and not in the alternative, the forfeiture takes place
at the time the offence is committed, and operates as a statutory
transfer of the right of property to the government: Boberts v.
Witherhead, 12 Modern Rep. 92; Salkeld 223; Wilkins r.
.Despard,5 T. R. 112; United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee,
8 Cranch 398; The Mars, Id. 417 ; Gelsten v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat.
311; Wood v. United States, 16 Peters 362; Caidwell v.
United States, 8 Howard 381.
The case of The United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee arose
under the 5th section of the Non-Intercourse Act of March 1809,
2 Stat. at Large 529, which provides " That whenever any
article * * 4 the importation of which is prohibited by this act,
shall, after the 20th of May, be imported into the United States
* * * or be put on board of any ship or vessel, boat, raft, or
carriage, with intention of importing the same into the United
States * * * all such articles, as well as all other articles on
board of the same ship or vessel, boat, raft, or carriage belonging
to owner of such prohibited articles, shall be forfeited, and the
owner shall, moreover, forfeit and pay treble the value of such
articles."
The claimants made precisely the same plea which Walker &
Co. and Gheens & Co. make in this case ; that is, they alleged
that they were bond fide purchasers for a valuable consideration.
The case was most ably and elaborately argued, but the Supreme
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Court overruled the plea and held that by the terms of the .statute
the forfeiture took place upon the commission of the offence, and
the purchaser was not protected. It will be perceived that this
statute does not fix the time at which the forfeiture is to take
place in more explicit terms than does the statute under which
the present case arises. The one declares that whenever any
article shall be imported it shall be forfeited, and that the owner
shall forfeit other property, and the other declares that the
owner, agent, or superintendent, &c., * * * who shall neglect to
make true and exact entry and report, or to do any of the things
required by law, shall forfeit, &c. If the forfeiture under the
Act of 1809 takes place at the time of the commission of the
offence, so as to override the title of all subsequent purchasers,
and this, we have seen, the Supreme Court have expressly decided, I can conceive of no argument which would not refer the
forfeiture under the Act of 1864 to the same time, or which
would not invest the forfeiture with the same consequences.
The case of Gelsten v. ofoyt, 3 Wheat. 311, involveaI a construction of the Neutrality Act of 1794, i Stat. at Large 883,
the third section of which declares a forfeiture of vessels fitted
out and armed to be employed in the service of a foreign state in
committing hostilities against the citizens, subjects, or property
of another foreign state with whom the United States are at peace.
The court say " the forfeiture must be deemed to attach at the
moment of the commission of the offence, and consequently from
that moment the title of the plaintiff would be completely divested
so that he could maintain no action for the subsequent seizure.
This is the doctrine of the English courts, and it has been recognised and enforced in this court upon very solemn argument."
The case of Caldwell v. The United States involved, in part,
the construction of the 68th and 66th sections of the Collection
Act of 1799, 1 Stat. at Large 677, the latter of which declares a
forfeiture in the alternative, that is, of the goods or their value,
and the former declares it without any alternative.
The inferior court had instructed the jury "that if the goods
were fraudulently entered, it is no matter in whose possession
they were when seized, or whether the United States had made
an election between the penalties, and that the forfeiture took
place when the fraud, if any, was committed, and the seller of
the goods could convey no title of the goods to the purchaser."
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The Supreme Court say: "This instruction is partly right and
partly wrong : right in respect to the 68th section, as the penalty
is a forfeiture of the goods without an alternative of their value;
wrong as the instruction applies to the 66th section, the forfeiture
under it being ' either the goods or their value.'
"In the first the forfeiture is the statutory transfer of right
to the goods at the time the offence is committed. If this was
not so, the transgressor against whom, of course, the penalty is
directed, would often escape punishment and triumph in the cleverness of his contrivance by which he has violated the law. The
title of the United States to the goods forfeited is not consummated until after judicial condemnation, but the right to them
relates backwards to the time the offence was committed, so as to
avoid all intermediate sales of them between the commission of
the offence and the condemnation.
" So this court said in the case of United States v. 1960 Bags
of Coffee, 8 Cranch 398. It was said again in the case of The
United States v. Brigantine MiVfars, 8 Cranch 417. Declared
again, four years afterwards, in Crelsten v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 311,
in these words: ' The forfeiture must be deemed to attach at
the moment the offence is committed, so as to avoid all sales
afterwards.'"
There is, we have seen, no alternativein the 68th section of the
Internal Revenue Act of 1864. The forfeiture of the spirits,
stills,boilers, and other vessels used in distillation, is by it directly
declared. Its construction is, therefore, fixed by the decisions to
which I have referred, almost as certainly and conclusively as if
its provisions had been the direct subject of adjudication. The
conclusion to my mind, then, is irresistible, that the forfeiture
denounced by this section, to use the language of the Supreme
Court, "takes place at the time of the commission of the offence,
so as to avoid all sales afterwards."
It is just to the learned counsel of the claimants to say, that
they concede this would be the correct construction of the section
if it had, in so many words, declared that the spirits, &c., should
be forfeited. They say that the statute does not declare that the
spirits, &c., shall be forfeited, but that the owner, agent, or
superintendent shall forfeit them, and that this difference of language requires a difference of construction.
Their argument is extremely refined, and is difficult to state.
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If I understand- them, they contend, that there is a difference
between the construction of a statute which denounces a forfeiture
of specific property as the penalty of an offence, and one which
declares that the offender shall forfeit it. In the first case they
concede that the forfeiture takes place at the time of the commission of the offence, whilst in the latter they insist it does not take
place until seizure, conviction, or judgment. No adjudged case
or other authority has been cited in support of this distinction,
and I am unable to conceive any good reason for upholding it.
What ground is there for referring the forfeiture to the time of
seizure ? There must have been a previous forfeiture to authorize
a seizure. The seizure is the consequence of *the forfeiture, not
the cause. Nor do I see any reason for referring the forfeiture
to the time of conviction or judgment. The conviction and judgment are simply the consummation of the proceeding that the law
requires to be instituted to ascertain the fact or forfeiture of which
the seizure is the beginning.
If the statute made the forfeiture the consequence of the personal conviction of the offender, in which case there is no seizure,
or if it even required a personal trial and conviction to precede
judgment of forfeiture, there might be some force in the argument
of the learned counsel founded on forfeitures at common law in
cases of treason and felony. I admit that, at common law, there
was no forfeiture of the goods and chattels of a felon until he was
convicted; but, under that law, no penalty whatever could be
inflicted for the crime of felony except in cases of suicide, flight,
and perhaps a few other analogous cases, until after the personal
conviction of the offender, and in the excepted cases the forfeiture related to the time of the offence. When the felon was
convicted, death was the penalty, and judgment of death followed.
A forfeiture of goods and chattels was a consequence of the conviction, and a forfeiture of real estate a consequence of the judgment; but forfeiture was no part of the judgment. Here, however, we are not trying the offender at all, or, if at all, only
incidentally. He is not personally before the court, and cannot
in this proceeding be convicted. The statutes under which we
are proceeding do not make the forfeiture the consequence of his
conviction, but of his offence, which offence it authorizes to be
inquired into by a seizure of, and proceeding against, the property
itself. Having ascertained that offences were committed, I cannot
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in this proceeding render any judgment against the offender; I
can only render a judgment of condemnation of property, which
judgment is merely the judicial ascertainment of the fact that the
property was previously forfeited.
When a statute declares that an offender shall forfeit property
as the penalty of his offence, and authorizes a proceeding in rein
to ascertain the forfeiture, I am satisfied that the forfeiture takes
place at the time of the commission of the offence just as certainly
as it does when the statute directs, not that the offender shall forfeit, but that the property itself shall be forfeited. There is a
distinction between common-law and statutory forfeitures. Common-law forfeitures, except in cases of deodand, suicide, flight,
and perhaps a few others, were the consequence of the conviction
or of judgment against the felon, and followed his personal trial;
but statutory forfeitures are usually enforced by proceeding
against the thing, and relate to the time of the commission of the
offence. This distinction is recognised by the Supreme Court in
the case of The United States v. Grundy et al., 3 Cranch 337,
and other cases. They say "1when the forfeiture is given by
statute the rules of the common law may be dispensed with, and
the thing forfeited may either vest immediately or on the performance of some particular act, as shall be the will of the legislature."
When there is no alternative in the statute, when it directly
declares a forfeiture, and no time subsequent to the committing of
the crime is named at which the forfeiture is to take effect, the
settled rule, we have seen, is, that it relates to the time of the
commission of the offence.
Whether the statute declares a forfeiture of property as the
consequence of crime, or that the person who commits the crime
shall forfeit it, the effect is the same. In either case the immediate loss falls on the owner. Whether the forfeiture is in consequence of his own unlawful act, or of the unlawful act of some
other person, respecting the thing forfeited, the loss is still his,
and his only. It is he who in fact forfeits or loses-no matter in
what language the forfeiture is declared. By the terms of the
statute we are now considering, the agent er superintendentwho
uses stills, boilers, or other vessels in the distillation of spirits,
and who neglects to do the things enjoined by law, forfeits as well
as the owner. But the agent is not owner, and literally he cannot forfeit what he does not own. He may cause its forfeiture by
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his unlawful act,.but he cannot lose what is not his. Therefore,
when the statute declares that the agent or superintendent shall
forfeit the stills, boilers, and other vessels, it must be understood
to mean that these articles shall be forfeited in consequence of his
neglect of duty. And, if this be its meaning, even the learned
counsel of the claimants would concede, that the consequence and
effect of the forfeiture are that the title to the thing f9rfeited
passes instantly upon the commission of the offence.
I o6serve that the learned judge of the Eastern District of
Missouri treats this 68th section as if it read, that the owner of
the pirits shall forfeit them. And on this reading he seems to
have founded his conclusion that the owner does not forfeit what
he sells before seizure. He says: "that as ' the owner,' &c., shall
forfeit, and not the purchaser, the owner can forfeit only what
belongs to him." It may be conceded that the owner can forfeit
only what belongs to him, but I do not see that this helps the argument ; for, if the forfeiture takes place, as I have shown it does,
at the time the offence is conimitted, it is not necessary to claim
that he forfeits more than what then belongs" to him. If he forfeits that, the title of the United Stites. immediately takes effect
and prevails over that of all purchasers: United States v. 896
Barrels, 8 Internal Revenue Recorder 128.
An attentive examination of the section, however, will show
that, by its terms, it is not the owner of the spirits, but the
owner, agent, or superintendent of the stills, boilers, or other vessels, used in the distillation of spirits, who forfeits. It is the
neglect to perform a prescribed duty by any one who uses stills,
boilers, or other vessels in the distillation of spirits, whether as
owner, or simply as agent or superintendent, which produces the
forfeiture ; and what are forfeited are the stills, boilers, and other
vessels, and The spirits made by or for him. If the agent forfeits
only what "belongs to him," he .forfeits nothing, for the stills,
boilers, and other vessels and spirits do not belong to him. They
belong to the principal. But the statute says the agent who
neglects, &c., shall forfeit these things, and there are no means
of escaping a provision so express. The statute, then, must mean
that these things shall be forfeited fdr the agent's neglect, or as
to him it is inoperative, and has no meaning at all. And, if they
are forfeited for his neglect, surely the forfeiture takes effect the
moment of neglect. There -is no other period" to which it can
possibly be referred.
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I have great respect for the opinions of the learned judge who
decided the case of The United Statesv. 396 Barrels,above referred
to. I have not ventured to differ from him until after the fullest
consideration and the clearest conviction. I cannot but think his
decision is based on a misreading of the statute, as well as on a'
misconception of adjudged cases. The conclusion to which I have
arrived is, I think, sustained by a recent unreported opinion of the
learned judge of the Southern District of Ohio, in the case of
TLe United States v. Sixteen Hogsheads of Tobacco, and by the
uniform decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States;
and I have not a doubt of its correctness.
I need not say that I have arrived at my conclusion reluctantly.
I have examined every provision of the statute ; I have attentively
considered the 180th section, and every section which declares a
forfeiture, and I think that the provisions of each and all of them
confirm the construction of the 68th section which is here
adopted. It would be a much more pleasing task for me to order
a restoration of the property seized to the innocent claimants
than to adjudge its condemnation, if I could do so consistently
with my sense of duty. I have been literally forced to a decision
in spite of my personal inclination by a current of authorities
which is irresistible.
Judgment of condemnation must be entered.
The counsel of Walker & Co., however, ask that the judgment
be limited to nineteen of the barrels claimed by them, and that
the other three seized in their possession be restored. This motion
is based on the following state of facts:The twenty-two barrels of spirits claimed by Walker & Co.
are part of a lot of thirty-seven barrels purchased at the same
time. Only thirty-two of the barrels were distilled by William
E. Reed, mentioned in the information. Five were distilled by
some one else, and as to them there is neither proof nor allegation
that there was any violation of law. If these five barrels
remained and could be identified as among those seized, they
would be restored, of course. But Walker & Co. mixed the whole
thirty-seven barrels together in the process of rectifying, and,
after rebarrelling and selling a portion of the compound, the
twenty-two barrels seized remain, so that it is now impossible to
iLdeftif any of the spirits which were not distilled by William E.
Reed. It is possible, and perhaps probable, that five thirty-seventh
parts of the twenty-two barrels, or about three barrels in quantity,
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were not distilled by him. But it cannot be alleged with absolute certainty that any part of the five barrels remain.' All that
can be said is that it is probable. And if any part of them remain,
it is, of course, impossible to separate that part from the rest.
If, then, I restore to Walker & Co. three barrels, those barrels
will contain some whiskey which has been forfeited, and, therefore, belongs to the United States. I have no right thus to dispose of the property of the United States. I have no right to
make an equitable division between them and the claimants. I
am obliged to give to the United States all the spirits which are
shown to be theirs. If the claimants, by mixing their own whiskey with that of the United States, have rendered it impossible to
identify theirs, they must suffer the consequence of their own act.
They made the mixture, it is true, in perfectly good faith, in the
regular exercise of their trade and business, and believing that
the whole of the whiskey belonged to them; still, by their act
they have put it out of their power to give to the United States
only what belongs to them. They are obliged, by force of a wellknown rule of law, to surrender to the plaintiffs all that belongs
to them; although in so doing they may be obliged to give up
some that belongs to themselves.
If one intermixes his goods with those of another, without his
knowledge or consent, so that they cannot be identified, the law
does not allow him any remedy, but gives the entire property,
without any account, to him *hose original dominion or property
is invaded (2 Blackstone's Com. 405).
The order of condemnation must therefore include the whole
of the thirty-two barrels. Nor does this decision work in this
case any real hardship. The United States are actually entitled
to thirty-two barrels of the whiskey purchased by Walker & Co.
They claim in this suit only twenty-two, leaving with Walker &
Co. ten or the proceeds of ten, which are not claimed and may
never be claimed.
In concluding this opinion, I adopt what the Suprmine Court of
the United States said in announcing their decision in a similar
case:" It is true that cases of hardship and even absurdity may be
supposed to grow out of this decision ; but, on the other hand, if,
by a sale, it is put in the power of an offender to purge a forfeiture, a state of things not less absurd will certainly result from it.

